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1 This paper was presented at a workshop on "Life in the Eurozone With or Without Sovereign Default?" 
that took place at the European University Institute in Florence on April 14, 2011. 2 
 
1. Introduction 
Among the countries currently experiencing sovereign debt crises, Ireland’s case is 
perhaps the most dramatic. As recently as 2007, Ireland was seen by many as top of the 
European class in its economic achievements. Ireland had combined a long period of 
high economic growth and low unemployment with budget surpluses.  The country 
appeared to be well placed to cope with any economic slowdown as it had a gross debt-
GDP ratio in 2007 of 25% and a sovereign wealth fund worth about €5000 a head.  
Fast forward four years and Ireland is shut out of sovereign debt markets and in an EU-
IMF adjustment programme. Its debt-GDP ratio has soared over 100% and the sovereign 
wealth fund is effectively gone.  In this short paper, I provide a brief review of how this 
rapid change came about and discuss potential future developments in relation to 
Ireland’s sovereign debt situation. 
2. The Rise and Fall of the Celtic Tiger 
It is now well known that Ireland’s famed “Celtic Tiger” ended with the collapse of a 
housing bubble and a banking crisis. Many have thus been tempted to describe the Irish 
boom as largely built on an unstable credit splurge. However, this would underestimate 
the true progress made by the Irish economy during the two decades prior to 2007. 
The Birth of the Tiger 
Before the “Celtic Tiger” became a well-known phrase during the 1990s, the Irish 
government had implemented a wide range of policies that helped to produce large 
increases in labour productivity. The 1960s saw a move away from protectionist trade 
policies and set Ireland on the path to EU membership in 1973. Industrial policies 
focused successfully on encouraging export-oriented foreign direct investment.  There 
was also a gradual improvement in educational standards as policies to provide 
universal secondary education in the 1960s were subsequently followed by a large 3 
 
expansion of the third-level sector.  As a result of these policies, Irish productivity 
growth consistently outpaced other advanced economies from the early 1970s onwards 
and by the middle of the last decade, Irish labour productivity was very close to US 
levels (see Figure 1).
2
While Ireland’s pre-Tiger supply-side policies may have been good ones, its 
macroeconomic stabilisation policies were not so good. Ireland reacted to the global 
slowdown of the 1970s by running very large fiscal deficits, which cumulated in a debt 
crisis in the 1980s. At the same time, the traditional currency link with sterling was 
dropped for membership of the European Monetary System, which provided an 
unstable monetary regime featuring regular devaluations. 
 
By the mid-1980s, Ireland had a debt-GDP ratio over 110 percent and was paying out 
almost 10 percent of GDP per year in interest payments. Tax rates had been raised to 
punitive levels in a series of failed attempts to stabilise the deficit and growth had 
stagnated.  
It was at the depths of this previous crisis that the birth of the Celtic Tiger took place.  
The period from 1987 onwards saw fiscal problems dealt with via a programme that 
focused on restraining spending and by 1989, Ireland’s debt dynamics had clearly 
moved in direction of sustainability. At the same time, the EMS finally also delivered a 
period of monetary stability. With macroeconomic stability restored and good 
fundamental policies in place, the Irish economy began to grow at an impressive rate. 
Indeed, Ireland in the late 1980s was primed for growth. While its workers were 
becoming increasingly productive, Ireland was significantly under-employed by 
international standards. As Figure 2 shows, only about 30 percent of the population was 
at work in the late 1980s. This underemployment partly reflected an exceptionally high 
                                                 
2 These data come from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics International Comparisons website.  
www.bls.gov/fls/intl_gdp_capita_gdp_hour.htm.  4 
 
unemployment rate (Figure 3). However, it also reflected demographic and social 
factors.
3
Ireland’s baby boom occurred in the 1970s and peaked in 1980, so the depressed 
Ireland of the 1980s was supporting a very large population below working age. This 
demographic pattern gradually unwound over time so that by the late 1990s, Ireland 
had a higher fraction of the working age population than either the US or the UK (see 
Figure 4). Ireland in the late 1980s also had a very low rate of labour force participation: 
While female labour force participation had increased steadily in other countries 
throughout the 1960s and 1970s, this pattern was not replicated in Ireland (see Figure 
5). However, when the economy recovered, there was a large female labour supply 
ready to enter the workforce. 
  
The combination of these factors meant that the Irish economy became an incredible 
employment creating machine. Employment rose steadily from 1.1 million in the late 
1980s to 2.1 million in 2007. Combined with steady improvements in productivity, the 
Irish economy delivered a period of extraordinary growth: From 1987 to 2007, economic 
growth averaged 6.3 percent per year.  
This exceptional economic growth allowed Irish governments to achieve a holy grail that 
was the envy of politicians around the world: They lowered tax rates and raised 
spending year in and year out and yet economic growth delivered sufficient tax 
revenues to generate a string of budget surpluses. By 2007, Ireland’s low stock of debt 
appeared to position the country well for coping with a slowdown. 
The Housing Boom 
Unfortunately, Ireland’s position in 2007 was not nearly as strong as it appeared to 
many outsiders or to the government of the time. Despite high levels of labour 
                                                 
3 See Honohan, Patrick and Brendan Walsh (2002). “Catching up with the Leaders: The Irish 
Hare,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity part 1, pages 1-57. 5 
 
productivity, the later years of the Irish boom saw the build-up of dangerous 
imbalances. At the heart of these imbalances was an extraordinary housing boom.  
At the turn of the millennium, Ireland still had a relatively small housing stock, the 
smallest stock per capita in the European Union.
4
The response to this increase in housing demand was an extraordinary construction 
boom. The total stock of dwellings—which had stood at 1.2 million homes in 1991 and 
had gradually increased to 1.4 million homes in 2000—exploded to 1.9 million homes in 
2008. House completions went from 19,000 in 1990 to 50,000 in 2000 to a whopping 
93,000 in 2006. Figure 7 puts this in context by comparing house completions per capita 
with their equivalent in the United States. It shows that while Ireland’s rate of housing 
completions during the 1970s and 1980s, had been comparable to that seen in the US, 
housing activity gradually increased in Ireland—particularly after 2002—to the point 
where per capita completions were four times as high in Ireland as in the US. 
  With population growing, incomes 
expanding rapidly and EMU providing access to mortgage finance at historically low 
rates, there was a surge in the demand and ability to pay for housing. As a result, house 
prices in Ireland quadrupled in price between 1996 and 2007, a pace of increase double 
that seen in the United States over the same period (see Figure 7). 
Construction became a dominant factor in the Irish economy. With the economy already 
at full employment, much of the labour employed in the construction boom came from 
the new EU member states in Eastern Europe, and this inward migration further fuelled 
the demand for housing. By 2007, construction accounted for 13.3 percent of all 
employment, the highest share in the OECD. Indeed, with the exception of Spain and 
Portugal, Ireland’s share of construction employment exceeded all other OECD member 
states by almost five percentage points. 
The Irish government of recent years placed much of the blame for the economic 
collapse on the international financial crisis. However, the evidence suggests that 
                                                 
4 See Somerville (2007). 6 
 
Ireland was heading for a rough landing even in the absence of an international 
recession. Measured against various “fundamental” factors, Irish house prices became 
more and more over-valued and, by early 2007—well before the first outbreaks of the 
international crisis—Irish house prices began to fall.
5
As house prices fell, the demand for new houses began to collapse with the attitude of 
potential buyers swiftly changing from being desperate to “get on the property ladder” 
to deciding to wait to get a better price later. In mid-2008, the new Minister for Finance, 
Brian Lenihan noted that the housing market had “come to a shuddering halt”.  Figure 7 
illustrates the scale of the collapse in housing construction, while Figure 8 shows how 
the subsequent decline in construction employment directly accounted for about two-
thirds of the jump in the Irish unemployment rate after 2007.  House prices have now 
fallen about 40 percent from their peak values and continue to fall. 
  
3. The Sovereign Debt Crisis 
With the Irish economy having placed so many of its eggs in the construction basket, 
one might have expected the authorities to have been careful to prepare for what was 
going to be an inevitable slowdown. This, however, was not the case. While a very low 
debt-GDP ratio due to years of fast economic growth may have appeared to provide a 
significant cushion against any downturn, Ireland’s fiscal situation turned out to be 
heavily dependent on the health of its property sector. 
A Huge Deficit Opens Up 
The collapse in construction activity, and the corresponding jump in unemployment, 
resulted in a large loss in income tax revenues and an increase in social welfare 
payments but if the fiscal consequences of the housing crash had been limited to these 
                                                 
5 There was relatively little discussion in Ireland at the time of the idea that house prices were 
unsustainable even though it didn’t require sophisticated analysis to suggest that house prices were over-
valued.  Notably, when Irish academic economists such as Alan Ahearne or Morgan Kelly questioned the 
sustainability of house prices, they received a very negative reaction from the Irish government. 7 
 
impacts, Ireland would have been positioned to cope well. However, Ireland’s tax base 
had been altered during the later periods of the boom to collect more and more tax 
revenue from construction activity.   
Figure 9 shows the share of total tax revenue due to income taxes (the black line on the 
left scale) and due to asset-based taxes such as stamp duties, capital gains tax and 
capital acquisition tax.
6
By late 2008, the collapse in construction activity was apparent and the world economy 
was entering a severe recession. Irish real GDP declined by 3.5 percent in 2008 and by 
7.6 percent in 2009. Despite having had years of budget surpluses, Ireland was suddenly 
facing a yawning fiscal gap. Indeed, it was apparent by early 2009 that, without fiscal 
adjustments, Ireland was heading for deficits of as large as 20 percent of GDP.   
  Thanks to booming housing activity and surging house prices, 
the share of tax revenue due to these asset-based taxes rose steadily during the 1990s 
and then rapidly during the period after 2002. At the same time, there was a 
corresponding reduction of a similar magnitude in the amount of revenue collected 
from income taxation. When construction activity collapsed, this substantial source of 
government revenue disappeared almost overnight. 
The scale of these potential deficits meant that, despite the low starting level of debt, 
the Irish government realised there was no room for discretionary fiscal stimulus to ease 
the effects of the severe downturn. Instead, from late 2008 onwards, the Irish 
government has implemented a sequence of contractionary budgets featuring a 
cumulative total of tax increases and spending cuts worth €20.8 billion.  These 
adjustments are the equivalent of 13 percent of 2010’s level of GDP or €4,600 per 
person and represent the largest budgetary adjustments seen anywhere in the 
advanced economic world in modern times.
7
                                                 
6 Ireland does not have a standard property tax. Instead, the government levied a stamp duty tax that was 
paid in full when a house was purchased. With high levels of housing activity, this collected a lot of 
revenue during the boom and almost nothing in recent years. 
 Despite these enormous adjustments, the 
7 The IMF’s October 2010 World Economic Outlook examined historical episodes of fiscal consolidation in 
fifteen advanced economies over 1980-2009. As a percentage of GDP, Ireland’s 2009 consolidation was 8 
 
decline in the size of the Irish economy has been so severe—nominal GDP has declined 
by almost 20 percent—that the European Commission are still projecting a budget 
deficit of 10.6% in 2011. 
The Banking Crisis 
The tale of the Irish fiscal crisis is gruesome enough if one focuses alone on the collapse 
of the construction sector and its effects on revenues and expenditures. However, the 
straw that broke the Irish camel’s back was the effect on the state finances of the 
government’s attempts to deal with a banking crisis. 
The acceleration in housing activity after 2002 that is evident in Figure 7 was largely 
financed by the Irish banks. These banks significantly changed their business model 
during the later years of the boom. Prior to 2003, the Irish banks had operated in a 
traditional manner, with loans being roughly equal to deposits. After 2003, these banks 
increased their property lending at rapid rates and financed much of this expansion with 
bonds issued to international investors.   
From less than €15 billion in 2003, international bond borrowings of the six main Irish 
banks rose to almost €100 billion (well over half of GDP) by 2007. In addition to rapidly 
expanding their mortgage lending, the Irish banks also built up huge exposures to 
property developers, many of whom had made fortunes during the boom and were 
“doubling down” on property with ever more extravagant investments.  Many of these 
development loans were used for investments that could only have paid off if property 
prices continued to rise. Leading the way was the now-notorious Anglo Irish Bank, which 
specialised in property development. Anglo expanded its loan book at over 20 percent 
per year and is now known to have had a series of serious corporate governance 
problems. 
                                                                                                                                                 
the biggest the IMF researchers could find. The subsequent adjustments for 2010 and 2011 were of 
similar size. 9 
 
During 2008, as evidence built up of the scale of the Irish construction collapse, 
international investors became concerned about the exposure to property investment 
loans of the Irish banks. These banks found it increasingly difficult to raise funds on 
bond markets and by late September 2008, two weeks after the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers, the Irish bankers turned up at government buildings looking for help. 
The Irish government’s decision on September 30, 2008 to give a near-blanket 
guarantee for a period of two years to the Irish banks has been, and will continue to be, 
hotly debated. The government appears to have taken seriously the assurances of the 
Irish Central Bank that the banks were fundamentally sound and were merely suffering 
from a short-term liquidity problem. Thus, the government appears to have believed 
that the guarantee would not have consequences for the state finances. However, there 
is also evidence that senior civil servants, as well as Merrill Lynch (who had been 
recruited as advisors in the weeks prior to the decision) warned against the dangers of a 
blanket guarantee. 
By Spring of 2009, it became apparent that the losses at the Irish banks were extremely 
large, most notably at the dreaded Anglo Irish Bank. This paper will not focus on the 
various strategies the Irish government adopted from that point onwards to deal with 
the crisis. However, the fact that the liabilities of the banks were guaranteed by the 
government played a key role in limiting options to restructure insolvent banks in a way 
that would have seen losses shared with private creditors.  Thus, in 2009, the 
government began using state funds to recapitalise the guaranteed banks. 
The Endgame 
By 2010, it was clear to international financial markets that in addition to a serious 
problem with its budget deficit, Ireland was facing a large bill of uncertain size in 
relation to fixing its banking sector.  A National Asset Management Agency (NAMA) was 
set up to issue government bonds to the banks to purchase distressed property assets at 10 
 
a discount and as 2010 went on and NAMA acquired more properties, it became clear 
that the final bill for recapitalising the Irish banks would be enormous.  
In September 2010, the government provided a “final estimate” that Anglo Irish Bank 
would cost the state about €30 billion or almost €7000 per person living in Ireland 
today.  The cost of these losses is being covered by a “promissory note” which will make 
cash payments over a number of years but which was fully counted against Ireland’s 
general government deficit in 2010, leading to what must be a world record official 
deficit of 32 percent of GDP. 
As the economy failed to show evidence of a strong recovery, international markets also 
became increasingly concerned with the future losses of the Irish banks due to 
mortgages and business loans. The banks had been able to issue bonds from late 2008 
to early 2010 under the protection of the state guarantee. However, as concern about 
potential sovereign default began to rise, this guarantee ceased to be of much use. 
Many of the bonds that had been issued matured in September 2010, when the original 
guarantee ran out.  
When the banks failed to find new sources of market funding to roll maturing bonds or 
replace the corporate deposits that also began to leave the system at this point, they 
turned to the ECB for emergency funding. Borrowing from the ECB by the guaranteed 
banks, which had been negligible prior to the crisis, jumped from €36 billion in April 
2010 to €50 billion in August to €74 billion in September. The banks also began to run 
out of eligible collateral to use to obtain loans from the ECB, at which point the ECB 
allowed the Central Bank of Ireland to begin making “emergency liquidity assistance” 
loans to the Irish banks  
International markets, which had been reasonably confident throughout 2009 that 
Ireland would make it through without a sovereign default and which generally had a 
favourable view of the Irish government’s fiscal adjustment programme, became 
increasingly concerned that the Irish banking sector was going to destroy the 11 
 
creditworthiness of the Irish sovereign. Bond yields on sovereign debt rose in 
September and October and then moved up dramatically in November following the 
famous Deauville declaration of Mrs. Merkel and Mr. Sarkozy. 
4. The EU-IMF Bailout and Future Prospects 
By mid-November, the game was up for the Irish government. Failing to see any sign of 
improvements in the banking situation, the ECB appears to have made its continued 
support for the Irish banking system contingent on Ireland applying the EU and the IMF 
for a multi-year lending programme. 
The EU-IMF Deal 
In late November, the Irish government agreed a multi-year funding deal with the EU 
and the IMF.  The programme contained commitments to implement a further €15 
billion in fiscal adjustments over the period 2011-2014, including a €6 billion adjustment 
for 2011 that was implemented in the budget passed in December 2010. Figure 11 
shows the path for the Irish budget deficit that is projected by the European 
Commission.  The deficit is projected to remain high over the next few years but to 
gradually move towards 3 percent of GDP in 2015. 
The EU-IMF programme also contains a set of measures to stabilise the banking sector. 
Rather than stabilise the banking situation, the announcement of the EU-IMF deal 
appears to have intensified the problem for a while, as deposits continued to flee the 
Irish banking system and reliance on central bank funding increased even further. The 
programme included a commitment to conduct a further round of “stress tests” on the 
Irish banking system. These tests were released at the end of March and were 
accompanied by a commitment from the Irish government to provide a further €24 
billion in funding to recapitalise the continuing Irish banks to high levels.
8
                                                 
8 Anglo and the smaller but equally profligate Irish Nationwide Building Society are being wound down. 
   It remains to 12 
 
be seen whether these announcements will stabilise the funding situation for these 
banks. 
With the latest announcements, the Irish government has now provided (or is about to 
provide) recapitalisation funds of about €70 billion (about 45 percent of the 2010 level 
of GDP) to offset the losses made by the Irish banks. Some of this money may eventually 
provide a return if the state’s shares in banks such as Allied Irish or Bank of Ireland are 
sold to private ownership at some point in the future but the vast majority of these 
funds are simply gone. 
Debt Sustainability 
The official EU-IMF line is that Ireland will return to borrowing in the sovereign debt 
markets in late 2012 and will be able to do so at rates that allow the debt to be 
sustained. This will be re-enforced by a slow but steady return to economic growth that 
will see the economy growing by 3 percent per year in real terms by 2014.  
The black line in Figure 12 shows the debt-GDP ratio that would be associated with this 
relatively rosy scenario. The debt-GDP ratio, which had been as low as 25 percent in 
2007 but is estimated to be 112 percent in 2011 is now projected to peak at 120 percent 
in 2013 and only slowly decline thereafter.  Interest as a share of GDP, which had 
started the crisis at only one percent, is projected to stabilise at about 6 percent in GDP, 
while the primary deficit is projected to move from 8.6 percent in 2010 to a primary 
surplus of 3 percent in 2015 (see Figure 13). 
There are some arguments in favour of such a scenario occurring. Despite very high 
yields on secondary market debt, the coupon rates on Ireland’s existing private debt are 
very low. The average interest rate that Ireland paid on its debt in 2010 was about four 
and a half percent. The average interest rate on EU-IMF package of 45 percent of GDP is 
higher than that on existing debt but it also has a relatively long maturity of seven and 
half years, so Ireland will not be under huge pressure over the next few years to replace 13 
 
this funding with private borrowing. Thus, official projections are based on the idea that 
the average interest rate that the Irish government will pay on its debt will stabilise at 
about 5.4 percent in 2014 (see Figure 14) which provides room for a small primary 
surplus to start reducing the debt ratio. 
There are also some compelling arguments against the official scenario. The assumed 
return to steady 3 percent growth may be too optimistic. Ireland cannot rely on a return 
of many of its previous sources of growth such as productivity catch up, demographic 
patterns and growth in participation.  
Fiscal adjustment and debt overhang problems will continue to depress domestic 
demand. And while the Irish government regularly points to the role improving 
competitiveness should play in boosting exports in the coming years, the plan appears 
premised on a smooth recession-free ride for the world economy in the coming decade.  
It also assumes that the government will not be providing further funds to recapitalise 
the Irish banking sector, which owes vast quantities to emergency lending to the ECB 
and Irish Central Bank. Taken together, the official analysis paints a fairly rosy scenario 
which may not come to pass. 
Another factor worth noting is that Ireland’s debt burden looks even higher when 
measured relative to GNP as opposed to GDP. For most countries, there is very little 
distinction between these two measures. However, a large (indeed, increasingly large) 
fraction of Irish output is due to profits that are repatriated by multinationals. The 
relatively low corporate tax rate of 12.5 percent that is charged on these profits has 
been a repeated source of controversy but it is unlikely that the Irish government is 
going to introduce large changes to this rate as it is seen as central to industrial policy. 
For this reason, most of the tax burden falls on the domestic incomes measured by GNP 
and as the blue line in Figure 12 illustrates, this measure of the debt-burden is set to top 
150%. 14 
 
As of now, financial markets appear to be placing more emphasis on the negative 
factors than on the positive factors stressed by the EU and the IMF. Yields on Irish 
government debt are above 10 percent and this pricing appears to be based upon the 
assumption that there will be a debt restructuring.  Against this background, the official 
plan’s assumption that private sovereign borrowing will recommence in late 2012 seems 
optimistic. There may be some secondary market activity in Irish debt at the current 
high yields but it’s questionable whether Ireland can sell the large amounts of debt that 
would be required to finance itself once the EU and IMF funds run out. 
An ESM Solvency Test? 
Based on the European Commission’s projections, Ireland is likely to run out of money in 
early to mid-2013 if it cannot access funds in the private sovereign bond market.  At 
present, my guess is that Ireland will not be able to sufficiently return to the sovereign 
bond market to avoid having to request funds from the new European Stability 
Mechanism. 
According to the ESM “term sheet” released in March, a request for funds from the ESM 
will require a “sustainability analysis” to assess whether “a macro-economic adjustment 
programme can realistically restore the public debt to a sustainable.”
9
It is not clear how such a sustainability analysis will work but if the Irish government 
manages to stick to its current adjustment programme and the macroeconomic 
assumptions underlying this programme come to pass, it seems likely that an ESM 
analysis will produce similar projections to those currently published by the EU and IMF 
showing a stabilisation and reduction in the debt-GDP ratio. Most likely, under such a 
scenario, the debt will be deemed sustainable. If, however, Ireland falls short of the 
  If the debt 
burden is deemed unsustainable, then “the beneficiary Member State will be required 
to engage in active negotiations in good faith with its creditors to secure their direct 
involvement in restoring debt sustainability.” 
                                                 
9 See www.gouvernement.lu/salle_presse/actualite/2011/03-mars/21-mes/esm.pdf  15 
 
targets set in the current adjustment programme and the debt outlook looks worse in 
2013, then this will raise the question of whether private sector debt should be 
restructured.  
A Uruguay style “light dusting” restructuring (to borrow the phrase used by Buchheit 
and Gulati, 2011) in which maturities are extended while coupon payments are 
maintained at existing levels, may prove attractive for the EU and IMF because a second 
deal for Ireland would see the balance of risk on Irish sovereign debt shifting over from 
private bondholders to the official sector. Moreover, with both the IMF and soon the 
ESM claiming a creditor status that is senior over private bondholders, such a deal could 
be a tipping point that rules out private purchases of Irish government bonds for a 
number of years.  A light dusting approach would lock in a large volume of privately 
supplied funds that could share the burden that could be associated with any later more 
severe restructuring of Irish sovereign debt. 
Which route is chosen, and how any potential restructuring is organised, are likely to 
depend on events elsewhere. Greece appears to be closer to point of sovereign debt 
default than Ireland and the consequences of any attempts to restructure Greek debt 
would have a significant impact on the attitude of the European authorities to applying 
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Figure 14: Average Interest Rate on Irish Government Debt 
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